society-to address wrongs. Third, I agree that reconciliation between parties 'in conflict' or having been wronged should not be expected; this and related ideas such as forgiveness and apology, are hoped for outcomes of justice processes by some advocates, but they are better seen as gifts, unexpected and without anticipation of reciprocity. Fourth, 'offender' and 'victim' are problematic terms, but I do not know how they can be easily replaced. The problem, in part, is the limits of (the English) language; and in part, finding one word to convey a temporally specific status of a person or organisational entity. Fifth, punishment has many meanings, and it is a distasteful term to many; but it is an evolving concept and cannot be willed away.
Conflicts and wrongs
Conflicts encompass a range of structural social problems, which affect individuals and groups. Thus, war is a conflict; and during war, groups and individuals hurt and kill others.
Societal social and economic inequalities create conflicts among individuals and between individuals and the state. The word is serviceable, but only to a point. We also need to ask: what are the acts of 'chaos, destruction, and misery'? Who is culpable, and who is responsible? Perhaps Christie would say that responsibility rests with society, the broad set of social arrangements that spawns conflict. Then, we are left with the acts themselves; and here Christie suggests that we should not presume an offender (or victim) at the outset, but rather, we should be open-minded by asking 'what happened', and we should seek to 'create understanding … from whole stories'. I am analysing materials on youths who have been charged with sex offences against their siblings, and I am reading the research and clinical literatures on cases like these. I find that the youths, even those who admit to offending, do not or cannot fully disclose 'what happened' to their parent(s) or legal authorities, although they may to counsellors after many months. 'What happened' in these cases is not a once-off incident, but a pattern of on-going sexual abuse, lasting on average over 40 weeks.
2 There are many barriers to disclosing the abuse when it is occurring, which unless it is discovered by a parent or other adult, falls on a young victim. 3 In Australia in recent years, there has been a 'shift in thinking … from a punitive response to a much more therapeutic response ' (Stathopoulos, 2012: 1) 
Conventional and innovative justice
Christie equates 'justice' with law, and specifically, penal law. He has a particular meaning of justice in mind, as an equality of response to 'like crimes'. I agree with his view that a just response-defined solely as responding with 'equal severity' to crime of 'equal seriousness'-does not have real people and real cases in mind. However, there are other types of justice responses (civil and administrative), not just penal responses; in addition, 'alternative' mechanisms could work alongside criminal, civil, and administrative law; and there are mechanisms in civil society, 'outside' law.
In recognition of this diversity, I propose we view justice mechanisms as residing on a continuum from conventional to innovative. Conventional and innovative are overlapping categories; they are not mutually exclusive and can be combined in hybrid forms.
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Conventional responses are concerned with improvements to evidence gathering, prosecution and trial, and supports for victims in legal contexts. (Braithwaite, 1999: 1) , but I believe restorative justice is better viewed as a nominal concept that stands for a set of activities (typically associated with face-to-face meetings with admitted offenders, victims, and relevant others; but including other practices), rather than as literally and narrowly being about 'restoring'. This conceptual shift is important in debating the appropriateness of restorative justice in cases of gendered violence (Curtis-Fawley and Daly, 2005) . As Christie observes, 'She moved out … It is all over'. There is nothing in the relationship to restore.
The problem with restoration, and its companion term, reparation, is far deeper and more significant than this. These terms are defined differently, depending on a writer's disciplinary frame of reference, and whether the focus is on domestic or international or transitional justice (Daly and Proietti-Scifoni, 2011 ). Although we are familiar with the problems of defining restorative justice, the situation is worse for reparation and restoration, especially when these terms are applied to domestic justice contexts.
Recognition and understanding
If we imagine two protagonists (along with their friends, kin, or others), who are brought 'so close that they can see each other', as Christie says, we may hope to see a mutual recognition and understanding of the other. This is the limit of what we should hope for. Even then and depending on the context in which meetings occur, we should not expect to see recognition and understanding most of the time. 9 To expect more than this-reconciliation, forgiveness, a sincere apology-is to expect too much. Wonderful, if it happens, but do not expect it. On all these matters, I concur with Christie. Realities-the real stories of restorative justice-are some distance from advocates' rosy pictures (Daly, 2006) .
Offenders and victims
We know that many offenders have been victimised, and that victims have offended; further, for some offences, it may be difficult to discern who is the 'offender', and who, the 'victim'.
There should be no fixed status of 'offender' and 'victim' over time, although it does seem to stick. 10 Worse, some offenders become identified for life by their wrongs to others, as in 'murderer', 'sex offender', and 'thief'-other examples of being 'imprisoned in the term', as For victim, Christie is concerned that aspects of the 'whole story' are lost through the 'black and white' penal lens. This occurs within a criminal trial; but more information and complexities do emerge, and more of the 'whole story' can come forward in face-to-face meetings such as youth justice conferences, when admitted offenders meet victims. Again, I
do not wish to paint a rosy picture because important details in the 'whole story' may not be revealed by those involved, particularly when victims are young. Further, for some offences (especially youth peer assaults), both protagonists may see themselves as 'the victim' (Daly, 2008) . In these cases, the term 'victim' does not pose an impediment to the group's discussion, although the question of who is the victim may be challenged. I suspect Christie may see this as optimal, although my research finds that it can also promote re-victimisation when a person's experience of harm is minimised or denied. Other examples come to mind in our research on sibling sexual abuse. In the conferences for these cases, a parent (typically a mother) has a dual role in representing her abused child and supporting her abusive
11 I am open-minded about identifying new terms, but Christie's person who 'complains' and the other, who 'returns the complains', would not be my first choice! Offending and victimisation are socially constructed; they reflect actions, reactions, and social processes of categorisation. A gerund (verbal noun) may be better able to create this sense of dynamism than a noun.
child/youth. It is a difficult role, but it makes sense to a parent who loves both children and wants to 'be there' for both of them. For a parent, the terms victim and offender are not the problem. Rather, it is being made to 'tell the story' over and over again to those who inquire (often, but not always, the professionals). A desire to understand and hear the 'whole story' sounds appealing, but we need to be aware of how it affects those who must tell the story (again).
Punishment
Restorative justice classics by Eglash, Barnett, and Zehr were 'against' punishment (see Daly, 2013) . Christie (1977 Christie ( , reprinted 2003 Although these ideas were presented many years ago, it is of interest to see how
Christie imagined the contingency of punishment in his ideal court. 'Maybe nothing could be done or nothing would be done. But neighbourhoods might find it intolerable that nothing happened'.
There are several positions in the punishment debate in restorative justice. 14 Duff (2003) assumes the necessity of punishment to achieve restoration; by punishment, he means wrongdoers must suffer remorse and censure, and that reparation must be burdensome. At the other end of continuum, Walgrave (2008) views punishment as incompatible with restorative justice; he imagines that in most cases, restoration can be achieved more effectively without a decision-maker intending to cause suffering. Taking a mid-way position is London (2011), who like Duff, sees punishment as compatible with restorative justice, although he does not view punishment as necessary to achieve restoration; rather, it is 14 My summary here simplifies more complex arguments. I would add that the authors have in mind only domestic contexts of responding to wrongs; in the transitional justice literature, authors are able to bifurcate punishment of offenders from reparation to and support of victims.
introduced after other means of restoring trust are found to be inadequate. Christie's earlier article (1977) and more recent (2013) thinking ('the outcome of a meeting between conflicting parties might end in satisfaction for both of them') come closest to London's idea of punishment as a contingent decision.
It is not practical or desirable to be 'against' punishment, however authors may define this term. This is because punishment is an evolving concept and social practice; and although we may desire to see it become 'more civilised' or humanised, that is not the same as being 'against' it. The moral intuition that an offender should 'repay' wrongs remains strong, in the same way that Christie (1977) imagined that 'neighbourhoods might find it intolerable that nothing happened'. Punishment, as a word and idea, cannot be willed away.
Words, more words. Thank you, Nils.
